A discrete-time financial market model is considered with a sequence of investors whose preferences are described by their utility functions Un, defined on the whole real line and assumed to be strictly concave and increasing. Under suitable hypotheses, it is shown that whenever Un tends to another utility function U∞, the respective optimal strategies converge, too. Under additional assumptions the rate of convergence is estimated. We also establish the continuity of the fair price of Davis [4] and the utility indifference price of Hodges and Neuberger [9] with respect to changes in agents' preferences.
Introduction
In the present article we are interested in the following question: does the convergence of agents' preferences entail the convergence of the respective optimal strategies? We assume that these preferences are of von Neumann-Morgenstern type (see e.g. p. 56 and p. 91 of Duffie [7] for a discussion of this concept): they are described by means of utility functions, i.e. strictly concave, increasing functions U n , n ∈ N converging to some utility function U ∞ . In Jouini and Napp [11] the case of a complete market model driven by Brownian motion has been studied, where investors' utility functions are defined on the positive axis. It was shown that the convergence of optimal strategies indeed takes place under appropriate conditions.
In this paper we focus on different classes of models and agents: discretetime markets with finite time horizon and utility functions defined on the whole real line. Note that these financial market models are, unlike the ones in Jouini and Napp [11] , generically incomplete. The study of such markets is totally different and more involved than that of complete markets. We will make extra assumptions such as strong no arbitrage and bounded price process (see section 2.1 for precise definitions). In section 3, we will give counter-examples which show why such assumptions are necessary.
Our main result is that the convergence of utility functions implies the convergence of the respective optimal strategies. Under stronger assumptions we also show that the convergence rate is the same in both cases.
In incomplete markets the choice of a suitable pricing rule is a fundamental issue. So we establish the convergence of two types of utility-based prices: fair price (see Davis [4] ) and utility indifference price (see Hodges and Neuberger [9] ).
We treat the utility maximization problem using the dynamic programming principle, along the lines of Rásonyi and Stettner [16] . This is a natural approach in the discrete-time context. In continuous-time models, however, a functional analytic machinery has been developed, see Kramkov and Schachermayer [14] and Schachermayer [18] (for previous work consult the references therein). This latter method passes by the dual problem, i.e. minimizing a conjugate functional over the set of risk-neutral measures. Applying dynamic programming avoids introducing the dual problem and allows us to obtain bounds on the strategies. It is these explicit estimates which make our proofs work and it does not seem to be feasible to get them through the alternative approach.
Model description and main results
Let (Ω, F, (F t ) 0≤t≤T , P ) be a discrete-time filtered probability space with time horizon T ∈ N. We assume that F 0 coincides with the family of P -zero sets.
Market description
Let {S t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T } be a d-dimensional adapted process representing the discounted -by some numéraire -price process of d securities in a given economy. The notation ∆S t := S t − S t−1 will often be used. Trading strategies are given by d-dimensional processes {ψ t , 1 ≤ t ≤ T } which are supposed to be predictable (i.e. ψ t is F t−1 -measurable). The class of all such strategies is denoted by Φ. Denote by L ∞ , L ∞ + the sets of bounded, nonnegative bounded random variables, respectively, equipped with the supremum norm · ∞ .
Trading is assumed to be self-financing, so the value process of a portfolio ψ ∈ Φ is
where z is the initial capital of the agent in consideration and ·, · stands for the inner product in R d . The following technical condition (R) roughly says that there are no redundant assets, even conditionally.
(R) The affine hull of the support of the (regular) conditional distribution of ∆S t with respect to F t−1 is almost surely equal to R d , for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Remark 2.1 Dropping (R) and modifying Assumption 2.3 in an appropriate way proofs go through but they get very messy. In this case one obtains that suitably defined projections of the optimal strategies (associated to the sequence of preferences) on the affine hull figuring in condition (R) converge to the projection of the optimal strategy for the limit preference.
The following absence of arbitrage condition is standard, it is equivalent to the existence of a risk-neutral measure in discrete time markets with finite horizon (as in the present case) as shown by Harrison and Pliska [8] for finite Ω and Dalang et al. [3] for general probability spaces. To have a similar result in continuous-time models one has to consider approximate notions of no-arbitrage, the so called "free lunches", see Kreps [15] , Delbaen and Schachermayer [5, 6] .
However, we need to assume a certain strengthening of the above concept hence an alternative characterization of (N A) is provided in the Proposition below. Let Ξ t denote the set of F t -measurable d-dimensional random variables,
Proposition 2.2 (R) + (NA) is equivalent to the existence of F t -measurable strictly positive random variables β t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 such that
Proof. The direction (R) + (N A) ⇒ (1) follows from Proposition 3.3 of Rásonyi and Stettner [16] . The other direction is clear from the implication (g) ⇒ (a) of Theorem 3 in Jacod and Shiryaev [10] and from the fact that if (R) failed we would have, for some ξ ∈Ξ t ,
on a set of positive measure, contradicting (1). 2 We formulate a stronger concept of absence of arbitrage. It is a strengthening of the "uniform no-arbitrage" appearing in Schäl [20] and Korn and Schäl [13] . See also Schäl [19] for a related concept. We stress that, by the Proposition above, Assumption 2.3 below implies both (NA) and (R).
Assumption 2.3
There exist constants β, κ > 0 such that
We show in section 3 that the problems of interest in this paper may be ill-posed if Assumption 2.3 is not satisfied.
Agents' preferences
Introduce the notationN := N ∪ {∞}. Consider a sequence of agents with preferences converging to some limiting preference. Assumption 2.4 Suppose that U n : R → R, n ∈N is a sequence of strictly concave and increasing continuously differentiable functions such that for all
Remark 2.5 Note that the above Assumption implies the uniform convergence of both U n and U ′ n on compacts, by p. 90 and p. 248 of Rockafellar [17] .
A further technical condition needs to be imposed.
Assumption 2.6 Assume that there exist 0 < γ < 1,x ≥ 0 such that for all λ ≥ 1, y ≥x and for all n ∈N
Remark 2.7 This assumption says that agents' utility functions satisfy a certain "uniform asymptotic elasticity" condition at +∞, see Kramkov and Schachermayer [14] , Schachermayer [18] and Remark 2.4 of Rásonyi and Stettner [16] about this notion, compare also to property (P3) on p. 135 of Jouini and Napp [11] . Without some hypothesis of this kind there might not exist an optimal strategy, see section 7 of Rásonyi and Stettner [16] . All results of the present paper hold under a similar uniform asymptotic elasticity condition at −∞ instead of +∞, see Assumption 2.5 of Rásonyi and Stettner [16] .
In case we would like to estimate the rate of convergence, a strengthening of Assumption 2.4 will be needed.
Assumption 2.8
The functions U n , n ∈N are strictly concave, increasing and twice continuously differentiable. For all N > 0, the second derivative satisfies the bounds
with constants ℓ(N ), L(N ) > 0 and there exists a sequence of real numbers g(n) → 0, n → ∞ such that
where the C(N ) are suitable constants.
Remark 2.9
The condition on U ′′ n is a kind of "uniform strict concavity" property. Under Assumption 2.8 the inequality
shows that U n tends to U ∞ uniformly on compacts with convergence speed O(g(n)). Note that if U n tends to U ∞ uniformly on compacts with convergence speed O(g(n)) then (2) does not necessarily hold true.
Example 2.10 Typical examples are the sequences U n (x) = 1 − e −αnx , x ∈ R, 0 < α n , n ∈N where α n → α ∞ at a given rate O(g(n)), see also the sequence U n of Example 3.1.
Optimization problems and convergence of optimal solutions
Fix some G ∈ L ∞ + and define
where Φ(U n , G, z) denotes the family of strategies ψ ∈ Φ such that EU n (V z,ψ T − G) exists. When we do not want to stress the dependence on G, we shall also write u n (z) instead of u n (G, z).
If G is interpreted as the payoff at time T of some derivative security, the quantity u n (G, z) represents the supremum of expected utility from initial capital z when delivering G at the terminal date.
Theorem 2.11 Suppose that S is bounded and Assumptions 2.3, 2.4 and 2.6 hold. Then there exist almost surely unique optimal strategies ψ *
Moreover, lim n→∞ u n (G, z) = u ∞ (G, z) uniformly on compact sets.
The notation ψ * n (z) will also be used when it doesn't lead to ambiguity. 
Remark 2.13 Consider random utility functions U n (x, ω). In this paper we study the economically meaningful case where U n (x, ω) = U n (x − G(ω)). Nevertheless results of Theorem 2.11 (resp. 2.12) can be extended to general random utility functions if we assume an almost sure analog of Assumption 2.4 (resp. 2.8) and the additional hypothesis :
Applications to convergence of utility based prices
Take again G ∈ L ∞ + , interpreted as the payoff at time T of some derivative security.
A remarkable pricing method has been suggested in Davis [4] : to evaluate claim G using the measure
where U is a suitable utility function and ψ * (0, z) is the optimal strategy with initial endowment z and without delivering any claim, i.e.
Under appropriate conditions (see section 6 of Rásonyi and Stettner [16] ), Q(z) indeed defines an equivalent risk-neutral measure and the fair price defined by
is an arbitrage free price. In this way individual preferences of agents are taken into account when choosing the pricing functional by some "marginal rate of substitution argument"; see Davis [4] or p. 229 of Bingham and Kiesel [1] for more economic justifications about this pricing rule. Theorem 2.11 permits us to establish the continuity of fair price with respect to changes in the agents' preferences.
Theorem 2.14 Under the hypotheses of Theorem 2.11, the Radon-Nykodim derivatives
, define equivalent risk-neutral measures for S and Q n (z) → Q ∞ (z) in the total variation norm. Consequently,
for any contingent claim G ∈ L ∞ + . Moreover, under the assumptions of Theorem 2.12, for all N ≥ 0 there exists some constant A(N ) such that
Now consider another pricing concept, originating from Hodges and Neuberger [9] . The utility indifference price of some bounded contingent claim G is the minimal amount of money to be paid to the seller and added to her initial capital so that her utility when selling G is greater than the one she could get without selling this product.
+ and x ∈ R, the utility indifference price p n (G, x) is defined as
It is easy to check that p n (G, x) is well-defined and 0 ≤ p n (G, x) ≤ G ∞ . In fact, this definition provides an arbitrage-free price, i.e. selling claim G will not create arbitrage opportunities in the market extended by G, this can be shown by an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3 in Carassus and Rásonyi [2] .
Theorem 2.16
Under the hypotheses of Theorem 2.11,
Counter-examples
In this section we demonstrate the pathologies which might arise in the absence of our assumptions. In all the examples we will suppose G = 0 for simplicity, so our value function will be
Firstly, the convergence of optimal strategies may fail for unbounded price processes, even though all the other assumptions hold.
with the convention 1/∞ = 0. It is easily verified that Assumption 2.4 and 2.6 hold for this sequence. Now set
Take T = 1 and ∆S 1 such that
where δ > 0 is to be chosen later.
It is easy to check that Assumption 2.3 holds and that for all n ∈ N and ψ = 0 we have EU n (ψ∆S 1 ) = −∞. Consequently ψ * n = 0 is optimal. On the other hand,
which is finite and, for δ sufficiently large, strictly greater than 0 = U ∞ (0), so ψ * ∞ (which exists by Theorem 2.7 of Rásonyi and Stettner [16] ) cannot be 0.
The following construction shows that if S fails to be bounded, the value functions u n may converge to ∞ instead of u ∞ .
Example 3.2 Let S 0 := 0 and
Define also
This sequence converges pointwise to
showing that u n (x) → ∞ > u ∞ (x). These U n satisfy Assumption 2.6. With some extra work it would be possible to construct a similar example with U n satisfying Assumption 2.4, too (i.e. U n strictly concave and smooth).
Now we point out what may go wrong in utility maximization if we drop Assumption 2.3: the value function u(x) may be infinite even if S is bounded! Example 3.3 Suppose that T = 2, Ω = (N \ {0}) × {0, 1} and P ({(n, i)}) = 1/2 n+1 , n ≥ 1, i = 0, 1. Furthermore,
set F 2 := P(Ω). Assume that S 0 = S 1 = 1 and
Taking ψ(n, 0) = ψ(n, 1) := 2 2n − 1, n ≥ 1, we clearly have
In this example one can take κ 1 = 1/2 constant, but β 1 cannot be chosen constant, hence Assumption 2.3 fails. A similar construction can be given where β 1 is constant and κ 1 is not.
Facts about utility maximization 4.1 Bounds on the optimal strategies
We work on the primal problem and use a dynamic programming procedure to prove the existence of optimal strategies and to derive bounds on them. If we used the dual approach (see Kramkov and Schachermayer [14] and Schachermayer [18] ), we should find bounds on the solution which would involve the set of risk-neutral measures that is even more difficult to handle. Theorem 4.4 below holds true under weaker hypotheses on (U n ) n∈N than Assumption 2.4. What we need is the following: Assumption 4.1 The functions U n : R → R, n ∈N are concave, nondecreasing and continuously differentiable, In what follows, it is crucial that the "asymptotic elasticity" property (Assumption 2.6 of this paper) admits a reformulation which is preserved during the dynamic programming procedure. This is the content of the next Condition. Let V : R → R be a function.
for all x ∈ R and λ ≥ 1.
We remark that the first inequality will be used when V (λx) is positive, the second when it is negative.
Fix some G ∈ L ∞ + and set U n,T (x, ω) := U n (x − G(ω)). Proposition 4.3 below initiates the dynamic programming. Proposition 4.3 Under Assumptions 2.6 and 4.1, U n,T satisfies Condition 4.1 almost surely with constants C 1 , C 2 independent from n.
Proof. Set C 3 (x) := sup n∈N |U n (x)| and C 4 := C 3 (0). DefineŨ n (x) := U n (x) − U n (0). By Assumption 2.6 we have for x ≥x and λ ≥ 1 :
For 0 ≤ x ≤x, using monotonicity:
Putting together the estimations so far, we obtain that the first inequality of Condition 4.1 holds forŨ n , n ∈N with uniform constantsC 1 := 0,C 2 := 2C 4 + C 3 (x). Now for U n,T we get
showing that the first inequality of Condition 4.1 is true for U n,T , n ∈N with the choice C 1 := G ∞ , C 2 :=C 2 + 2C 4 , uniformly in n. The second inequality follows in a similar way. 2 Theorem 4.4 Suppose that Assumptions 2.3, 2.6 and 4.1 hold. For all n ∈N, we introduce the following random functions :
For all n ∈N, 0 ≤ s ≤ T , U n,s are well-defined and satisfy for all x ∈ R and
EU n,s+1 (x) > −∞.
The functions U n,s have almost surely concave and nondecreasing continuously differentiable versions satisfying Condition 4.1 with constants uniform in n. For all n ∈N, 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 1 and x ∈ R, there existsξ n,s+1 (x) ∈ Ξ s such that
For all 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 1, there exist nondecreasing functions M s , Z s and H s : R + → R + such that for all n ∈N, x ∈ R:
For all n ∈N, z ∈ R the utility maximization problems
admit optimal solutions ψ * n (z) given by
There exists nondecreasing functions Υ t :
and the value functions of the optimization problems are finite, i.e. for all z ∈ R u n (z) = U n,0 (z) < ∞.
Proof. Suppose d = 1 for simplicity and let R denote a constant bound for the process |∆S|. Sections 4 and 5 of Rásonyi and Stettner [16] will be used, but the estimations have to be carried out in a more explicit way.
We shall apply backward induction to prove the statements from (6) to (12) . First, (7), (10) and (12) are trivial for s = T − 1 and Condition 4.1 for U n,T holds by Proposition 4.3. Moreover, as S and G are bounded, it is easy to see that U n,T −1 is well-defined.
The existence of almost surely concave, increasing, continuously differentiable versions for U n,T −1 and (6), (8) , (9), (11) for s = T − 1 will follow just like in the induction step below.
Let us proceed supposing that the induction hypotheses hold for s ≥ t. We get from (9) for s = t that
and from (10) for s = t
because M t+1 and U n are nondecreasing. Also
M t is nondecreasing as Z t+1 and M t+1 are. Using (8) for s = t and the fact that U n,t+1 is nondecreasing, we get that almost surely
showing (10) for s = t − 1. It is also clear from (9), (11), (12) for s = t and from the facts that H t+1 is nondecreasing and U ′ n,t+1 nonincreasing:
This, together with an upper estimate of the same kind, shows (12) for s = t − 1 with the choice
Moreover, as S is bounded, it is easy to see that U n,t−1 is well-defined. By the definition of U n,t−1 one has U n,t−1 (x) ≥ E(U n,t (x)|F t−1 ), so by (10) for s = t − 1 and (7) for s = t we get that (7) holds for s = t − 1. Now we want to prove that U n,t−1 (x) < ∞ almost surely and a bounded optimal strategyξ n,t (x) exists. Let y > 0. As U n,t is concave,
Using condition (10) for s = t − 1 we see that U n,t (0) ≤ U n (M t (0)), and from Assumption 4.1 we get that
We now prove that inf n∈N U ′ n,t (0) > 0. For this purpose, introduce the following sets:
A n,s+1 = {ξ n,s+1 (0)∆S s+1 ≤ 0}, s ≥ t.
From Assumption 2.3, P (A n,s+1 |F s ) ≥ κ. Apply (11) for s ≥ t:
iterating the same reasoning. We obtain that
which is strictly positive by Assumption 4.1. So by (17) and (18) there exists a constant N t (independent from n) such that U n,t (−N t ) < −1 with probability one, for all n ∈N. Now we will apply the estimations in the proof of Lemma 4.8 in Rásonyi and Stettner [16] to an arbitrary ξ ∈ Ξ t−1 , ξ = 0. By Condition 4.2 for U n,t :
Let |ξ| be ≥ 1 and so large that
and define B := { ξ |ξ| ∆S t < −β}. By Assumption 2.3, P (B|F t−1 ) ≥ κ. We clearly have
Consequently,
and the latter is a deterministic function, nondecreasing in |x| and independent of n, by Assumption 4.1. Now there exists some deterministic function u → Z t (u) ≥ 1, u ∈ R + (chosen to be nondecreasing) such that if |ξ(ω)| > Z t (|x|) then both (19) and (21) hold, here the infimum is finite by Assumption 4.1 again. Define the set A = {|ξ| > Z t (|x|)} ∈ F t−1 . From (20) , (21) and (10) for s = t − 1 we have that on
= E(U n,t (x + ξI A c ∆S t )|F t−1 ), with strict inequality on A. As |ξI A C ∆S t | ≤ RZ t (|x|),
Using (10) for s = t − 1 we get (6) for s = t − 1. Condition 4.1 holds for U n,t−1 with the same constants as in Proposition 4.3, by the argument of Proposition 5.2 of Rásonyi and Stettner [16] . The hypotheses needed in the cited paper are (6), (7) for s = t − 1 and Condition 4.2 for U n,t , so we can apply the results there: Proposition 4.4 implies that U n,t−1 have almost surely concave and nondecreasing versions, an optimal strategyξ n,t can be constructed and from Lemma 4.9 we obtain that (8) holds for s = t − 1 . Moreover, we get from Proposition 6.5 of the same paper that U n,t−1 has almost surely continuously differentiable versions and (11) is satisfied.
Apply the inequality (22) for ξ =ξ n,t (x); if we had P (A) > 0 then the strategyξ n,t (x)I A c would contradict optimality. So (9) holds for s = t − 1.
It remains to prove that the strategies defined by (13) are optimal. Just like in Proposition 5.3 of Rásonyi and Stettner [16] , we obtain that for any trading strategy ψ ∈ Φ(U n , G, z):
As U n,0 (z) is finite and F 0 is trivial one gets that u n (G, z) = U n,0 (z) < ∞, and ψ * n (z) is the solution of
By induction, it is easy to see from (9) that (14) holds with 
for the optimal strategies ψ * n (z) constructed in the previous Theorem. 
Uniqueness
Proposition 4.6 If we assume, in addition to conditions of Theorem 4.4, that the U n are strictly concave for n ∈N then the U n,t (and thus u n (G, ·) = U n,0 (·)) are strictly concave a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T and there exists an a.s. unique optimal strategy ψ * n .
Proof. To see strict concavity we argue by backward induction : the case s = T is trivial, suppose that for some s < T , x = y and an F s -measurable random variable 0 < α < 1 we have
on a set A ∈ F s of positive probability. By concavity of U n,s+1 and optimality ofξ n,s+1 (αx + (1 − α)y) we have
On A, the first and the third lines are equal, so from the equality of the first and the second lines we get
On A one has, by strict concavity of U n,s+1 , x +ξ n,s+1 (x)∆S s+1 = y +ξ n,s+1 (y)∆S s+1 .
As x = y, the quantityξ n,s+1 (x) −ξ n,s+1 (y) is nonzero, so we get on A,
The left-hand side is F s -measurable, so we arrive at a contradiction as ∆S s+1 has nondegenerate F s -conditional distribution by Assumption 2.3. Unicity of ξ n,t is shown in Theorem 2.8 in Rásonyi and Stettner [16] . 2
Facts about convergence
Corollary 5.1 Suppose that Assumptions 2.3, 2.4 and 2.6 hold. Then U n,t converges to U ∞,t uniformly on compacts, almost surely, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T . In particular, u n (G, ·) = U n,0 (·) converges to u ∞ (·) = U ∞,0 (·), uniformly on compacts.
Proof. It suffices to establish almost sure convergence pointwise as by monotonicity and concavity of U n,t this entails almost sure uniform convergence on compact sets, see p. 90 of Rockafellar [17] . Assumption 2.4 and strict monotonicity of U ∞ imply that Assumption 4.1 holds and hence Theorem 4.4 applies. It is clear from (8) that
by optimality of φ * n , Assumption 2.4, Remark 2.5 and the fact that the random variable l † ∞ is bounded by (14) and
In fact, all the l † n are bounded, uniformly in n ∈N (we will denote by K such a bound) and, recalling Assumption 2.4, the F t -measurable random variables U n,t (x) = E(U n (l † n )|F t ) are also bounded, uniformly in n ∈N. Hence by the argument in Lemma 2 of Kabanov and Stricker [12] , there exists an F t -measurable random subsequence σ n such that lim sup n→∞ U n,t (x) = lim n→∞ U σn,t (x).
Using again Lemma 2 of Kabanov and Stricker [12] for the uniformly bounded sequence l σn we can extract another random subsequence (for which we will keep the same notation) such that l σn converges to some l. Set l * := l − G.
The first term is o(1) using the almost sure uniform convergence on compact sets of U n to U ∞ and the fact that l † σn are uniformly bounded by K. As l σn → l a.s., U ∞ is continuous, |U ∞ (l † σn )| is uniformly bounded, we can use Lebesgue's theorem and the second term is also o(1). Since the set of portfolio values is closed in probability (see e.g. the argument of Theorem 1 in Kabanov and Stricker [12] ), l is itself the value of a portfolio. Now
by optimality of φ * ∞ , finishing the proof of this Corollary. 2 The following Lemma will be used to establish the rate of convergence for the optimal strategies. Lemma 5.2 Suppose that S is bounded, Assumptions 2.3, 2.6 and 2.8 hold. Considerξ n,s (x), n ∈N, 1 ≤ s ≤ T as defined in Theorem 4.4. Then for all N ≥ 0, almost surely,
with suitable constants
Proof. We remark that under Assumption 2.8, Assumption 4.1 is satisfied, so Theorem 4.4 applies. From now on we suppose d = 1 for the sake of simplicity. Let R be a constant bound for the process |∆S|. The proof is by backward induction: (23), (24) and (26) are clear for s = T from Assumption 2.8 and Remark 2.9, (25) follows just like in the induction step below, so let us proceed to the induction step immediately. Assume that (23), (24), (25) and (26) hold for s ≥ t. Let us establish them for s = t − 1. Let N > 0 and x ∈ [−N, N ], we apply (8), (9) and (11) for s = t − 1 and set X t = N + RZ t (N ). Then, using the induction hypotheses, (23) holds true because of
Let us define the random functions 
, where (27)
Proof of Claim 5.1. Continuous differentiability of f n,t as well as the form of the derivatives can be established in the same way as in Proposition 6.4 of Rásonyi and Stettner [16] , using the bounds in Theorem 4.4 and the induction hypotheses of Lemma 5.2. Then (28) and (29) follow. We omit further details. Smooth version ofξ n,t will be provided by the implicit function theorem. To see this, notice that by the construction ofξ n,t (x) in Rásonyi and Stettner [16] , a.s. ∀x f n,t (x,ξ n,t (x)) = 0, a.s.,
it is just the first-order condition for optimality. Moreover, by strict concavity of U n,t ,ξ n,t (x) is the a.s. unique solution of equation (31). For all N > 0,
by (24) and Assumption 2.3. Hence by the implicit function theorem (see p. 150 of Zeidler [21] ) there exist continuously differentiable (random) functions ζ n : R → R such that on a set of probability one ∀y f n,t (y, ζ n (y)) = 0.
Indeed, the result holds true in some neighbourhood of any real point and by unicity of the root of (31) it extends to the whole real line. We necessarily have for all x ζ n (x) =ξ n,t (x) a.s.
so a version ofξ n,t can be chosen which is continuously differentiable in x with the derivative given by (27). Finally, U ′′ n,t−1 exists and is of the form (30) by (11) for s = t − 1 and arguments akin to those of Proposition 6.4 in Rásonyi and Stettner [16] . To see that, one has to establish that Lebesgue's theorem applies when taking the derivative behind the expectation: (27), the estimates (9), (24) and Assumption 2.3 testify that
is uniformly bounded when x stays in a compact, so we may indeed differentiate under the expectation.
2 Now we turn our attention to (24) for s = t − 1. Define the new measures W n by α n := −EU ′′ n,t (x +ξ n,t (x)∆S t ),
χ n,t−1 := E(α n w n |F t−1 ).
First note that χ n,t−1 ≥ ℓ t (N +RZ t (N )), by (9) and (24) 
Remembering (30) and from the above equality we see that for 
which is true again by (24) for s = t. This shows the first inequality of (24) for s = t − 1. The proof of the second inequality is easier and hence omitted. We see as in (32) that for all n ∈N: 1 inf n,|ξ|≤Zt−1(N ),|x|≤N |∂ 2 f n,t−1 (x, ξ)| ≤ 1 κβ 2 ℓ t−1 (N + RZ t−1 (N )) =: m t−1 .
By the Lagrange mean-value theorem applied to ξ → f n,t−1 (x, ξ), one has for x ∈ [−N, N ] |ξ n,t−1 (x) −ξ ∞,t−1 (x)| ≤ m t−1 |f n,t−1 (x,ξ n,t−1 (x)) − f n,t−1 (x,ξ ∞,t−1 (x))| = m t−1 |f ∞,t−1 (x,ξ ∞,t−1 (x)) − f n,t−1 (x,ξ ∞,t−1 (x))| ≤ m t−1 C t−1 (N + Z t−1 (N )R)Rg(n) =: K t−1 (N )g(n),
where we used (31) for the equality, (23) for s = t − 1 and (9) for s = t − 2 in the second inequality. This ends the proof of (25) |U n,t (y) − U ∞,t (y)| +E(U ′ ∞,t (−Z t (0)R)|ξ n,t (0) −ξ ∞,t (0)|R|F t−1 ) ≤ B t (Z t (0)R)g(n) + U ′ ∞ (−H t (Z t (0)R))K t (0)Rg(n), using (8) and (9) for s = t − 1, the fact that U ′ ∞,t is nonincreasing, (26), (12) and (25). Define 
Proof of the main results
Proof. Theorem 2.11 Suppose that the Theorem fails and we have ψ * n,t (z) ψ * ∞,t (z) for some t and z ∈ R. We may and will suppose ψ * n,s (z) → ψ * ∞,s (z) a.s. 1 ≤ s < t. The ψ * n,t (z), n ∈ N are uniformly bounded by (14) , hence an argument similar to that of Lemma 2 in Kabanov and Stricker [12] provides an F t−1 -measurable random subsequence n(k) such that ψ * n(k),t (z) →ψ t a.s., k → ∞, The first term tends to 0 by Corollary 5.1 and the fact that x + p n k (G, x) ∈ [x, |x| + G ∞ ]. The second one is o(1) by the continuity of u ∞ (G, .) and p n k (G, x) → p. Since by definition of p n k (G, x), u n k (G, x + p n k (G, x)) = u n k (0, x), and from Corollary 5.1 u n k (0, x) → u ∞ (0, x), we get that u ∞ (G, x + p) = u ∞ (0, x), and then necessarily p = p ∞ (G, x).
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